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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff's appeal is from the Order Granting Summary Judgment 
(Defendant Rajsavong) entered by the Third Judicial District Court 
of Utah, The Honorable Robert K. Hilder, on November 16, 1995. 
This appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the 
order of the Utah State Supreme Court dated January 31, 1996, This 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
This appeal presents a single discrete issue for this court's 
review: Did the trial court correctly rule, as a matter of law, 
that Defendant Lucas Bodell's ("Bodell's") act of displaying and 
pointing a gun, and the resulting shooting death of Dennis Kierstad 
("Decedent") was not a foreseeable result of Defendant Lang 
Rajsavong's ("Rajsavong's") negligent and/or reckless driving. 
This issue presents a question of law, which this court reviews for 
correctness. E.g., Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an action brought by Somchay Bansasine, the 
former spouse of Decedent, on behalf of Susan Phoneprelai Kierstad 
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("Kierstad"), for damages stemming from the wrongful death of 
Decedent, Kierstad's father. Decedent died from a gunshot wound he 
sustained when he was shot by Bodell while riding as a passenger in 
Raj savong's vehicle. 
For the limited purpose of this appeal, so as not to interject 
immaterial factual disputes and unnecessary legal issues into the 
resolution of this case, Rajsavong accepts Bansasine's recitation 
of facts as contained in the Brief of Appellant (pp. 3-4).l 
Accordingly, for the purposes of this appeal, it may be assumed 
that Rajsavong owed a duty to Decedent which was breached by 
Rajsavong's driving and that Plaintiff suffered damages. The only 
issue before this court is whether Rajsavong's negligence was a 
proximate cause of Decedent's death and whether Bodell's 
xWhile Rajsavong accepts Bansasine's recitation of facts, 
Rajsavong disputes Bansasine's misinterpretation of those facts 
whereby Bansasine alleges that Bodell drew his gun in self-defense. 
(Brief of Appellant, pp. 1, 9.) This mischaracterization is 
irrational and has no support in light of Bansasine's own 
Statement of Facts. Bansasine states that once Bodell displayed 
the gun, Rajsavong took evasive action and Bodell chased Rajsavong 
at speeds exceeding 85 to 90 mph, that as Bodell got abreast of the 
Rajsavong vehicle Rajsavong slammed on his brakes in order to make 
Bodell's vehicle pass, and that Bodell shot Decedent as his vehicle 
passed Rajsavong's vehicle. (Brief of Appellant, p. 3.) Under any 
rational interpretation of these facts, as alleged by Bansasine, 
Bodell's act was not self-defense. 
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intervening act of drawing a gun and shooting Decedent constituted 
a superseding cause of Decedent's death. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The District Court properly determined as a matter of law that 
Rajsavong's conduct could not have been the proximate cause of 
Decedent's death. Regardless of whether Rajsavong was negligent or 
even reckless in his driving, Bodell's intervening act of drawing a 
gun and shooting Decedent supersedes any negligence on the part of 
Rajsavong as the proximate cause of Decedent's death. It was not 
foreseeable that Bodell would draw a gun and shoot Decedent in 
response to Rajsavong's driving. 
Bansasine's argument, that because it was foreseeable that 
Decedent could have been injured by Rajsavong's negligence in some 
other, unrelated, fashion, Bodell's intervening act was somehow a 
foreseeable response to Rajsavong's driving, is contrary to 
established Utah law. While an injury need not occur in the 
precise manner anticipated in order to be the proximate result of 
antecedent negligent conduct, the injury must be of the same 
general nature as that which was reasonably foreseeable in order 
for the antecedent conduct to have proximately caused the ultimate 
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result. In this case, the injury was of an entirely different 
nature from any injury reasonably to be anticipated as the natural 
consequence of Rajsavong's acts. 
Inasmuch as Rajsavong's conduct was not the proximate cause of 
Decedent's death, the trial court properly granted summary judgment 
in favor of Rajsavong. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Bansasine appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Rajsavong. For the purposes this appeal, the facts of 
this case are undisputed and Bansasine's appeal raises only a 
question of law. Accordingly, this court reviews the trial court's 
order for correctness. E.g., Neel, 889 P.2d at 923. 
II. BODELL' S ACT OF DRAWING A GUN AND SHOOTING DECEDENT WAS AN 
UNFORESEEABLE INTERVENING ACT WHICH SUPERSEDES ANY NEGLIGENCE 
ON THE PART OF RAJSAVONG. 
An action based upon negligence requires a showing of each of 
the following four elements: 
1. A duty of reasonable care extending to 
plaintiff (in this case Decedent); 
2. A breach of that duty; 
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3. Proximate and actual causation of the 
injury; and 
4. Damages suffered by plaintiff. 
Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 893 P.2d 598, 600-601 (Utah App. 
1995); Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). Regardless of 
whether factual issues exist regarding the other elements of a 
negligence claim, summary judgment is appropriate where the 
evidence fails to establish a direct causal relationship between 
the alleged negligence and the injury. Clark, 893 P.2d at 601; 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). 
Even where an actor is negligent, if the ultimate injury 
results from an intervening cause, which is not a foreseeable 
result of the original actor's negligent conduct, the intervening 
cause supersedes the actor's negligence as the proximate cause of 
the injury. See, Jensen v. Mountain States Tel, and Tel. Co., 611 
P.2d 363, 365 (Utah 1980); Harris v. Utah Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 
217, 219 (Utah 1983); McCorvev v. Utah State Deo't of Trans., 868 
P.2d 41, 45 (Utah 1993). 
In cases involving the intervening negligence of another, 
"[t]he proper test is whether the subsequent negligence was 
foreseeable by the earlier actor." Godeskv v. Provo Citv Corp., 
690 P.2d at 545. See also Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 
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P.2d at 246; McCorvev, 868 P.2d at 45; Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 
723, 728-29 (Utah 1985). To determine the foreseeability of the 
intervening cause, Utah courts have adopted Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, § 447, which states that the intervening act is not a 
superseding cause if: 
(a) The actor at the time of his negligent 
conduct should have realized that a third 
person might so act, or 
(b) A reasonable man knowing the situation 
existing when the act of the third person 
was done would not regard it as highly 
extraordinary that the third person had so 
acted, or 
(c) The intervening act is a normal 
consequence of a situation created by the 
actor's conduct and the manner in which it 
is done is not extraordinarily negligent. 
E.g., Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d at 729; Harris v. Utah Transit 
Auth., 671 P.2d at 219. 
Bansasine does not dispute that Bodell's act of brandishing a 
gun, and ultimately shooting Decedent, was an intervening cause. 
Rather, Bansasine argues that Bodell's intervening act was a 
foreseeable response to Rajsavong's driving, and therefore does not 
supersede Rajsavong's negligence as the proximate cause of 
Decedent's death. 
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Bansasine attempts to support his argument with anecdotal 
references to news reports of violent incidents involving persons 
driving automobiles. Notably, each of the news reports upon which 
Bansasine relies involves incidents which occurred after the 
shooting in this case, and many of the reports involve incidents in 
other areas of the country.2 In addition, Bansasine cites to a 
scene from the Steve Martin movie, "L.A. Story," as authority for 
his proposition that freeway shootings are commonplace. This 
fictional movie does not support Plaintiff's theory; it satirizes 
it. Whatever humor contained in the scene to which Bansasine 
refers lies in its absurdity. 
Bansasine's anecdotal, irrelevant and non-legal references in 
no way demonstrate that Bodell's conduct was foreseeable. 
Bansasine's claim that Rajsavong could or should have foreseen 
that, in response to Rajsavong's driving, Bodell would brandish a 
weapon and shoot and kill Decedent, has no foundation. 
2In the final paragraph of Bansasine's argument, Bansasine 
states that cases involving violent responses to negligent driving 
are "legion" (citing six cases). Brief of Appellant, p. 9. 
However, notwithstanding the purported legion of cases involving 
allegedly similar scenarios, Bansasine fails to cite a single case 
in which a negligent driver was held liable for injuries resulting 
from another's violent response. Rajsavong is similarly unable to 
locate such a case. 
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Applying the Restatement's three-part test for foreseeability 
of an intervening cause to the facts of this case, it is so clear 
that it can be found as a matter of law that Bodell's intervening 
act was extraordinary and unforeseeable: (1) At the time, Rajsavong 
could not have realized that Bodell would shoot Bansasine in 
response to Rajsavong's driving; (2) Any reasonable person would 
regard Bodell's act as highly extraordinary; and (3) Bodell's 
intervening act is not a normal consequence of negligent or 
reckless driving, and the manner in which Bodell's act was done was 
extraordinarily negligent. 
Even with the benefit of hindsight, such a response is 
shocking and, fortunately, highly extraordinary. Despite 
Bansasine's dismal portrayal, our society has not declined to the 
level of futuristic action movies or the Tumbleweed Gulch of the 
wild west portrayed on television. In our society we do not expect 
that an individual will draw a gun and shoot a someone as a 
"natural consequence" of another driver's negligence. For this 
Court to find otherwise would constitute a legal acknowledgment, 
from our State's high courts, that the citizens of this State must 
now expect public conduct consistent with lawlessness and a 
completely deteriorated society. 
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A. Bodell's act of drawing a gun and shooting Decedent was 
not foreseeable merely because an injury could have 
resulted from Raisavong's driving in some other manner, 
Bansasine also argues that because Rajsavong's driving could 
have caused injury in any number of specific ways, it does not 
matter that Bansasine's injury was of an entirely different nature 
than could have been foreseen. Brief of Appellant, pp. 7-8. Even 
under the authorities cited by Bansasine, the general nature of the 
injury must be foreseeable for the injury to have been proximately 
caused by Rajsavong's negligence. Id., quoting, Rees v. 
Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978). In Steffenson v. 
Smith's Management Corp., 862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993), the Utah 
Supreme Court quoted the following portion of a jury instruction 
with approval, as a correct statement of the law: 
Foreseeability in these instructions means 
injury or harm . . . which the defendant . . . 
could have reasonably anticipated as the 
natural consequences of fhisl actions, if any, 
even though [he was] not able to anticipate the 
particular injury which did occur. 
(Emphasis added and omitted). The court explained that "[t]his 
sentence correctly stated the law that only the general nature of 
the injury need be foreseeable." Id. 
Bansasine attempts to gloss over the requirement that the 
general nature of the injury must be foreseeable, by arguing that 
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injury could have happened in a number of ways including by 
accidental or intentional collision with Bodell or another 
motorist, or by gunshot. Bansasine's hypothetical examples beg the 
question of foreseeability. Had Decedent's death occurred from an 
accidental collision which resulted from Rajsavong's negligence, 
Rajsavong concedes that Decedent's death would have proximately 
resulted from Rajsavong's negligence. On the other hand, where a 
third-party intervenes to cause Decedent's death, for example, by 
intentionally ramming Rajsavong's vehicle or shooting Decedent, 
such acts are not foreseeable responses to negligent driving, and 
supersede whatever negligence Rajsavong committed as the cause of 
Decedent's death. 
Under Bansasine's argument, if an actor's negligence imperils 
another in any way, that actor is liable for any and all injuries 
to the other no matter what the cause. Such is not a correct 
statement of the law, and would preclude an intervening cause from 
ever superseding an actor's negligence as the proximate cause of an 
injury. 
While it may have been foreseeable that some harm could have 
befallen Decedent as a result of Rajsavong's negligence, that harm 
did not occur. Rather, Bodell intervened and shot Decedent. 
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Bodell's act was not within the realm which Rajsavong "could 
reasonably have anticipated as the natural consequences of his 
acts," nor was Bodell's fatal gunshot wound to Decedent of the 
"general nature of injury" foreseeable from Rajsavong's driving. 
Accordingly, Bodell's intervening act was not foreseeable and 
supersedes any negligent driving by Rajsavong as the sole proximate 
cause of Decedent's death. 
CONCLUSION 
In a claim for negligence, Bansasine is required to prove 
every element of her claim, including that Decedent's injuries were 
caused by Rajsavong's negligence. If Decedent's death resulted 
from some intervening cause which was not the foreseeable result of 
Rajsavong's negligence, that intervening cause supersedes 
Rajsavong's negligence as the proximate cause of Decedent's death. 
In our society, we do not anticipate that any individual will 
draw a gun and kill another because of a driver's driving, however 
bad. Such an act is shocking and highly extraordinary. Even 
assuming that Rajsavong drove his vehicle negligently as alleged by 
Bansasine, Bodell's act was not a foreseeable result of such 
driving. 
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It is immaterial that Decedent could have been injured or even 
killed as a result of Rajsavong's driving. In fact, Bodell 
intervened and shot Decedent, Because such an act is not a 
reasonably anticipated natural consequence of negligent driving, 
any negligence alleged by Bansasine on the part of Rajsavong is 
superseded by Bodell's intervening act. The trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Rajsavong should therefore be upheld. 
DATED this 2 1 ^ day of June, 1996. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
Lyrajr srT"levies 
Kenp W\ Hansen 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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